Abstract Several models (including the widely used Sznajd model) have been proposed in order to describe the social phenomenon of consensus formation. The objective of the present paper is to supplement the simulations based on these models with a "real world simulation"; it considers a situation which can be considered as an ideal laboratory for analyzing consensus formation, namely the authorization or prohibition of using cell phones while driving. This is a convenient laboratory for several reasons (i) The issue was raised in similar terms in all industrialized countries, a circumstance that facilitates comparative analysis by providing a set of observations (as opposed to single observations generated, for instance, in election contests). (ii) This is a situation where we happen to know the rule a "rational" agent should follow. (iii) Because the issue is a matter of life and death, the phenomenon can be considered as fairly robust with respect to various, endogenous or exogenous, sources of noise.
Introduction
In recent years the questions of information diffusion and consensus formation were studied by many authors. Among the landmark papers let us mention Kacperski et al. (1996) , Sznajd-Weron et al. (2000) , Stauffer et al. (2000) , Stauffer (2001 Stauffer ( , 2003 , Ball (2003) , Behera et al. (2003) . The last paper provides a clear comprehensive overall view of the applications of cellular automata in voting and consensus formation problems. This paper differs from the rich sample of simulations already proposed in the sense that it is what can be called a "real world simulation". Naturally, the data in table 2 (below) don't have the precision of simulated data, but the trend that they illustrate is sufficiently different from what simulations based on the Sznajd model predict to foster further reflection.
In a nutshell, the paper's main message is that socio-political macro-factors may, to a considerable degree, distort the standard pattern of consensus formation, either by restraining or by amplifying the diffusion of information. We use the expression "macro-factors" because usually they concern a whole community, region or country. Although this paper focuses on a specific case-study, namely the question of using a mobile phone while driving, there is good evidence that the existence of macrofactors is the rule rather than the exception (see the concluding section). Naturally, it would not be difficult to insert macro constraints into a one-or two-dimensional lattice simulation (they could be seen as additional external fields). The problem is rather that through the introduction of an extra set of unknown parameters the comparison between the model and the real world would lose much of its relevance, at least unless these parameters can be estimated a priori. In short, this problem calls for developing a reliable methodology for estimating macro constraints. This may not be an easy task, however.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides experimental and observational evidence about the risk of using a cell phone while driving. The third section examines how this information spread among industrialized countries. It reveals great differences: in some countries the process took one or two years, in others it took over ten years. In the latter cases, obviously the propagation of information was hindered and restrained by some powerful constraints. These constraints were able to block transmission through formal mass media channels as well as through informal channels (rumors, hearsay, gossip) . In the conclusion, we briefly address the question of the origin and strength of those macro-constraints.
Before getting started it should be emphasized that what makes this comparative study possible is the fact that the phenomenon that we consider takes comparable forms in different countries. Cell phones, cars, the reactions of drivers to disturbances, roads, traffic rules, or mass-media channels are fairly similar in all industrialized countries. It is this uniformity and homogeneity, that makes cross-national comparisons meaningful 1 . One of the most unquestionable observations was made in Japan. The ban on using hand-held cell phones while driving was imposed in November 1999. In the 6 months before enforcement there were 1,473 traffic accidents connected with drivers using mobile phones, whereas in the 6 months after the ban there were only 580 which represents a 61% drop (ROSPA p. 18).
The evidence
The other conclusions which emerge from table 1 are the following.
• The risk of accident is multiplied by a factor of the order of 4 to 5 when a cell phone is used while driving.
• Hands-free phones offer no benefit. A study by researchers at the university of Toronto and published in the New England Journal of Medicine (February 1997) authorized a comparison between hand-held phones and hands-free phones. The risk was found to be 4 times higher for the first device and 6 times higher for the second. This result could seem fairly counter-intuitive but becomes more understandable when one realizes that people with hands-free phones tend to make longer calls than people with hand-held phones and all studies have shown that it not the fact of holding the wheel with only one hand which is dangerous but rather the fact that the driver's attention is captured by the conversation. In short, hands-free phones do not provide any benefit in terms of safety.
• A study published in early 2004 by the Harvard Center of Risk Analysis estimated that drivers talking on cell phones are responsible for about 6% of all US auto accidents each year. This represents 2,600 people killed (i.e. 10 fatalities per million of population) and 330,000 injured (Sundeen 2004, p. 3). In order to realize that the previous data are consistent with one another and to make them fit with intuition, one should add a few explanations. The main question is how the fourfold ratio which was observed in the Canadian study can be consistent with the twofold decrease in the number of accidents that what recorded in Japan?
1) First, one should note that only hand-held phones were prohibited in Japan; if all kinds of phones had been prohibited a sharper decrease would likely have been observed.
2) Secondly, if (as claimed by the Toronto study) hands-free phones are not safer than handheld phones one may wonder how the decrease observed in Japan should be accounted for. The explanation is certainly that back in 1999 only few drivers had got hands-free sets which means that the vast majority had to stop using their phones altogether until having been able to buy hands-free sets. If this interpretation is correct one would expect the number of accidents to increase in the course of time as more and more drivers are able to use hands-free phones. This is indeed confirmed by the fact that in the second of the 6-month interval after the interdiction, the reduction in the number of accidents was smaller than over the first 6-month interval: it fell from 61% to 43%. (Edmonton Sun, Alberta, Canada February 27, 2004) . In other words, the benefits of the ban in terms of safety eroded in the course of time.
3) From a practical and intuitive point of view one may wonder why conversations on the phone are more distracting than conversations with passengers. There are two reasons for that. (i) Passengers spontaneously stop talking when the driver faces a difficult situation, for instance during a tricky overtaking.
(ii) There is evidence that phone conversations have a high emotional content. After all, as cell phone call are fairly expensive, people usually make a call in order to say something important.
An observation which support this assertion is the fact that the risk remains significantly higher over a time interval of at least 15 minutes after the end of the conversation. In short, cell phone conversations indeed seem to have a higher emotional content than conversations with passengers.
In the next section we analyze to what extent the information summarized in table 1 was disseminated in various countries.
Information dissemination and consensus formation
The dissemination of information by medias, road safety agencies, automobile clubs, etc. can be studied in two different ways. (i) By trying to assess the content of newspaper articles, agency reports, etc.
(ii) By examining the legislation which was enacted to cope with the problem. The first methodology is difficult to implement, not only because of the great number of publications, but also because it is not easy to assess their content in an objective and quantitative way. In the second approach, one considers only the outcome in terms of new legislation; this is a kind of back box approach in which the input is the evidence presented in table 1 and the output the legislation summarized in table 2.
Although much of this paper relies on this black box approach, in the appendix we also summarize some of the articles to get a more concrete feeling.
As one knows, the Sznajd model always leads to complete consensus. On account of the evidence presented in table 1, the only "rational" consensus would be to forbid the use of cell phones in cars, whether hand-hold or hands-free. This would safe at least 5,000 lives annually in North America and
Europe and a much larger number in coming years as cell phones and cars become more common in countries with large populations such as China, India and Indonesia. However, as shown in table 2, not a single country has banned hands-free phones. This suggest that, although available, the information pertaining to the risk of hand-free phones has been little circulated. In contrast, the information about the risk of hand-held phones was disseminated in many countries but with great differences in the delay required for consensus formation.
A missing variable In the Sznajd model each person holds one of several opinions and attempts to induce the same opinion in its neighbors on a checkerboard lattice. Various rules describe this persuasion process. For example, if two people adopt the same position, all their neighbors follow suit. In the course of time, the distribution of opinions fluctuates across the board until a consensus is reached with all sites sharing the same view. For most of the countries listed in table 2 there is an initial kernel of people holding opinion X (e.g. that using cell phone while on the wheel is risky) composed (at the very least) of the employees of safety agencies whose job it is to make risk assessments. In each country, the technical means by which information can be disseminated are very much the same, and yet, we have these huge differences in the delays required for passing new legislation. It could be argued that legislation is more difficult to pass in countries which are more centralized, such as Britain, France or Japan, because it takes longer for the information to reach the top of the "pyramid".
However, we observe the opposite: in the United States where such legislation can be passed at state level, the process took longer (even at the level of individual states) than in countries where the decision had to be taken at national level. In short, in their present form, consensus formation models can hardly account for what is observed. There is a missing variable.
The observation that the diffusion of news is affected by socio-economic, political or ideological factors comes hardly as a surprise. In the present case however, the information is not merely a piece of news, it is a matter of life and death. One might expect that in such a case the information would be transmitted as quickly as possible. If macro-factors play a crucial role even in such a case, one must wonder in which kind of situations "pure" consensus formation models (such as the Sznajd model) may apply. In order to bridge the gap between theory and observation, great efforts should be devoted to identifying, documenting and analyzing such situations.
The present example can also shed some light on the phenomenon of speculative bubbles. In 1999-2000 when the average price earnings ratio of the NASDAQ market reached the level of 200 (i.e. 10 times higher than its long-term average) it should have been obvious to everybody that the market was deeply out of balance. Yet, many medias claimed that the situation was sustainable. "We are making history" was the motto at that time. As in the cell phone case, the "rational" opinion was overridden by a flood of opinions generated by a collective phenomenon of self-delusion.
Currently (mid-2004) we have a similar situation in real estate markets. After the more than 100%
price increase that took place in many large cities (e.g. Boston, London, San Francisco, Sydney) it should be obvious that over the next five years (real) prices will fall by about the same percentage.
Yet, real estate experts and medias are almost unanimous in claiming that the price decrease will not exceed 15%. In short, these are examples of what can be called collective self-suggestions 2 .
One feature shared by all these cases is that huge amounts of money are at stake. 
A Appendix: Qualitative evidence about smoke screens
How do medias manage to duck the real issues? Let us for a moment return to the Wall Street Journal article that we mentioned in section 2. This was a full-page paper and one can therefore wonder how the authors were able to give a substantial account without ever mentioning the simple and plain facts reported in table 1. The question is of some interest because the arguments and tricks used as red herrings and smoke screens are not specific to this paper, but are very much the same in all the publications that try to sidestep the problem. First, the bias of the papers is reflected in the terms used by the authors: the word "safety" appears 15 times, whereas the word "accident" appears only once the impression that the issue is taken seriously, yet without mentioning hard facts. One trick is to give the impression that it is a complex problem for which no clear conclusion can be reached and to embed it into a variety of other issues ("a long list of other potential distractions, such as unruly children and talkative passengers"). Another artifice is to rely on studies which seem to support the view that there A testimony of the success of such disinformation campaigns is the fact that, according the the Na- 
